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ABSTRACT
The focus of this paper is to summarize the economic literature of the hot hand
phenomenon in basketball while adding in another study of my own. By using recent
NBA statistical data, I will show the advancement and evolution of this widely held
public belief that a certain number of makes or misses can alter the chances of the next
attempt’s success or failure. I start by recreating part of Gilovich, Valone, and Tversky’s
(1985) experiments with a larger set of data and finish by introducing Miller and
Sanjurjo’s fix to their method’s biases(2015). The major finding is when a three and an
eight percentage point correction for the bias from Miller and Sanjurjo’s calculations are
applied to my data set as well as many other studies, that a hot hand effect starts to
surface more frequently. This important correction allows us to flip the hot hand myth
from a “cognitive illusion” to a potentially significant effect on gameplay.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

An exceptional player is performing uncommonly, historically well. He’s on.
He’s in the zone. He has the “hot hand.” The hot hand is a term often used to describe a
player who is temporarily playing above his usual level of play with a string of shots that
seem to be successful at a higher rate with each additional made shot.
To basketball fans, this scenario is familiar. It’s what happened the night of Kobe
Bryant’s 81 point performance against the Toronto Raptors. An excellent player shot
16% better from the field than his career average. It’s moments like these that sports fans
live for. A game where an individual elevates his play to unprecedented levels.
However, is it possible for players to really be “on,” to “have the hot hand?” Is it really
the case that making a few shots in a row statistically improves your chance to hit the
next one?
Confidence is a clear factor in influencing the way the game is played, but the hot
hand phenomenon is almost exclusively tied to this as the driving force making this such
a popular expression with the public. Is confidence enough to make this “mind over
matter” momentum boost into a statistically significant effect?
What sports economists have been searching for over the past thirty years has
been a very slight effect compared to the public’s perception of a hot or cold state. If
shown plausible, such an effect even as slight as it may be on player performance could
lead to major changes in coaching decisions in crunch time situations. Currently the
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question of giving the ball to the player who is hot versus the player who is consistent is
unknown and a big part of why I did this study.
Randomness in sports has a massive effect on play, game, and even season
outcomes for teams. Every time a team takes the court there is a chance for anything to
happen, which can more or less be measured by player and team stats. Of course
uncertainty is why we play the game and practice is how players attempt to lower this
uncertainty. There will always be unexplained factors contributing to outcomes in either
direction, but like in a coin flip, general tendencies of prediction tend to hold. The basic
idea behind the “hot hand” though is that this uncertainty in skill and streakiness can
overpower the randomness of a coin flip type hit or miss outcome.
In 1985, psychologists/behavioral economists Gilovich, Valone, and Tversky
(GVT) investigated the validity of the “hot hand” in basketball. The underlying goal of
their research was to examine whether our belief that the previous outcome affects the
next “random” event. In their results, they “disproved” this commonly believed
phenomena by examining the Boston Celtics’ free throws and field goal records from 48
home games of the Philadelphia 76ers. Later, they conducted controlled experiments with
student-athletes from Cornell University in which students attempted to make as many
shots as possible and accurately predict the outcomes. Their data showed that there was
little to no correlation between successful attempts and the subsequent attempts success.
This paper has been extremely influential and is known to have popularized the idea of
the “hot hand fallacy.” Since its publication, there have been a number of major studies
that have revisited the idea.
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From here, the Hot Hand has been consistently labeled as nothing more than a
“fallacy” seeing that GVT called it a mere “cognitive illusion” by the public. Based on
common sense statistics, a player’s odds at hitting a shot is simply his/her make
percentage just as a coin has a 50/50 chance at being “heads” each flip. Rattle in a few
shots in a row or land a few heads and the public deems it a hot streak. In reality, the odds
of making those shots consecutively are high enough for it to be a rather regular
occurrence; thus the public’s willingness to deem a streak “hot” is usually premature.
GVT though had several errors in calculating the effect ranging from selection
bias in the data to a lack of controls for coaches and players adjusting their strategy to the
player who may be hot. This issue though is much bigger than just basketball, seeing that
many economists and psychologists overstate this “myth” in showing how humans
misjudge numbers, leading to many flawed spinoffs of anti-hot hand literature.
As recently as 2010, Rabin and Vayanos did a similar study of the hot hand within
the scope of the “gambler’s fallacy.” This study used some coin flip scenarios and the
main finding here was that people “underreact to short streaks and overreact to longer
ones”(Rabin and Vayanos 2010). The psychology of this can be applied to areas of
behavioral finance where people buy and sell in the stock market at these predicted rates.

Now to segway into the psychology side of the spectrum, it is believed that the
public’s conception of the hot hand’s effect on performance is much greater in magnitude
than it actually is. In a 2014 study by Blanchard, Wilke, and Hayden, it was noted that
hot hand biased based tendencies are readily apparent in the foraging habits of Rhesus
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monkeys, meaning this “clumpy” autocorrelation in a series of binary outcomes may be
more deeply ingrained into our psyche than previously thought(BWH 2014). As
imperfect humans, we gain confidence with the smallest increases in the probability of
success. Whether it is our human nature or not, the common person generally lacks a
sound knowledge of statistics. Therefore, an increase of shooting percentage of five
percentage points may cause an inflation of shooter and audience confidence as if it really
were a fifty percentage point increase. Their point here is that our overestimations of such
“hot” states is such a psychological illusion that it predates humankind as something
hard-wired into our psyches as primates.
Daniel Kahneman shows us in his book, Thinking Fast Thinking Slow, is another
prime example an economist/psychologist who took GVT’s work as fact.

“The hot hand is entirely in the eye of the beholders, who are consistently too
quick to perceive order and causality in randomness. The hot hand is a massive and
widespread cognitive illusion. [Could the same be said about much of the priming
literature?]”
(Kahneman 2011)
On the other side of the spectrum, Dixit & Nalebuff in their 1991 book, Thinking
strategically: the competitive edge in business, politics, and everyday life, show us that
not everyone is completely on board for GVT’s fallacy as being concrete.
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To expand on how widely held the idea is in the public sphere, we even see the
term stretched into the context of team performance levels. Daniel Stone and Jeremy
Arkes address this in their 2018 paper stating that the committee determining seeds for
the NCAA Championship Basketball Tournament under reacts to teams with strong
recent resurgences in performance going into the tournament even though these teams are
statistically shown to do better in tournament play. Using Sagarin Ratings and point
spreads, team performance vectors were heavily responding to hot hand stats and thus
leading to the many upsets that help the credibility of the tournament’s nickname, “March
Madness.”
The hot hand has been tested and yielded positive results in several other sports as
well such as bowling, billiards. In a 1995 study by Robert Adams, it was found that
professional billiards players had a significantly significant increase in their win
percentage in best of 21 matches if they had won the previous game or two in a
row(Adams 1995). It was noted mostly under the term “momentum,” but a hot hand type
effect nonetheless. As for bowling, Dorsey and Smith in 2004 found that professional
bowlers were increasing their probability of throwing a strike with statistical significance
as they had more strikes thrown immediately preceding an attempt from one to four. In
short, a player’s chances of throwing a strike after one to four previous strikes was
increasing with streak size. This phenomenon was called a “hot hand,” and rightly so was
another instance of positive significance in its favor.
To revisit the most common way people like to test probability, a simple coin flip
or game of matching pennies has been the focus of almost every hot hands paper. Taking
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a specific coin or event results where we know the absolute chances of it occurring and
recording the results is by far the best way to start investigating how streakiness and how
probabilities work on a fundamental level. Probabilities in these cases can be
predetermined by the notion that only a set number of occurrences can happen and at
these rates, therefore meaning that any combination of events will be within the ranges of
the mean result’s confidence interval. Taking events that do not have an absolutely black
or white chance of happening and recording these results like in a basketball game or
round of golf, on the other hand are much harder because the absolute chance of a result
occurring is unknown and left only to our records of occurrences to interpolate an
estimate of this value.
The idea of using a matching pennies type approach to this study has been
criticized as a biased estimate due to the understatement in the weighting of longer make
or miss streaks. Miller and Sanjurjo claim and show in their 2015 paper that “the
expected proportion of successes, on those realizations that immediately follow a streak
of successes, is strictly less than the underlying probability of success”(Miller and
Sanjurjo 2015).
This makes results found in early papers like Gilovich, Valone, and
Tversky(GVT)(1985) have estimates predicted to be between .08 and .12 percentage
points underestimated on the changes between a player’s normal state and a hot hand.
Miller and Sanjurjo also actually devised a fix to this bias, which they used on older data
sets like the GVT paper and yielded statistical significance for the hot hand. Here is
where the argument of improved approaches to the hot hand question begins to emerge.
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Many of the papers within the literature that have failed to find a “hot hand”
correlation lacked a high enough powered model to test the idea. Lack of sample
numbers, understated autocorrelation, and infrequent occurrences of true “hot hand”
situations have limited many papers’ ability to find a hot state.(Arkes 2013)
The statistical range that randomness occupies is quite large in the probability
spectrum, meaning that observations outside of this area are quite unusual in frequency.
This occurrence may only happen twice during a player’s career and maybe a few times
over a whole season, which makes a larger dataset more likely to find hot or cold states.
Most early papers sacrificed their ability to find these occurrences by limiting their
sample size to only one or two thousand observations(GVT 1985 had 887). In the 1980’s,
shot data was not nearly as easy to come by as today where NBA.com or data mining
websites like BigDataBall.com can give you every shot taken in a season by every player
with intricate details like floor position, time on the clock, and even defenders on the
floor. Thus, the studies of today have way more sample producing power than the studies
of yesterday.
Arkes’s 2010 paper on free throws needed roughly 28,000 data points to find a
three percentage point increase in make percentage between second free throw attempts if
the first shot was a make. The paper was the first of any in the literature to find
statistically significant evidence backing the hot hand’s existence. By using a “pooled,
multivariate framework,” Arkes was able to increase the testing power for this hot hand
effect. Aggregate shot data automatically gives more opportunities than regressing player
by player independently and thus the small hot hand effects are shown within the results.
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Conditional that a player has hit his previous shot, the probability of him making the next
shot increases by 1.9 percentage points, which is significant at the 90% confidence
level(Arkes 2010).
Andrew Bocskocsky, John Ezekowitz, and Carolyn Stein in their 2014 work took
this type of analysis a step further by looking at everything from defender distance as
streak numbers rise to the likelihood of a player taking the next shot in a streak. Their
results also found statistically significant evidence in favor of the hot hand with roughly a
1.2% (.54 percentage points) increase in make percentage on shots occuring after a shot
streak. The most important takeaway from their article though comes in the form of
defining what a hot hand really is.

“A player who makes three out of his past four layups is not hot, but a player
who makes three out of his past four three-point attempts is. In other words, being hot is
not about the absolute number of shots a player has previously made, but rather is about
how much he has outperformed, conditional on the types of shots he has taken.”
(Bocskocsky, Ezekowitz, and Stein 2014)

Having thousands of observations for shots that occur after different types of
makes and misses give this phenomenon new life and with the quality of game log shot
data increasing steadily in quality over the past fifteen years, there is no place left for the
hot hand to hide. On the other side of the spectrum, cold states are something that this
paper will examine as well. Although they are not as popularly tested within the
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literature, part of this paper’s hypothesis is that this cold state can be traced in a parallel
fashion to hot streaks. If this holds true, the phenomena would be a seamless number
check of our hot hand data.
With this notion of higher powered testing for the hot and cold hand in mind, this
paper will revisit the original procedure of measurement used by GVT and then apply
Miller and Sanjurjo’s fix to further investigate this hot topic in sports economics.
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II. THE SAMPLE

Our regressions were drawn from the 2016-2017 NBA regular season. Every shot
taken from season tip-off to the final shot in the finals is tracked within the dataset. We
attempt to find the probability of this phenomena being true in a relatively ordinary set of
circumstances with many observations.
With historically unprecedented data at the public’s disposal, we were able to
find every imaginable stat recorded on NBA.com. A detailed description of every shot
taken by every player in every game of the season was at our disposal. The meticulous,
detailed, and abundant data available make it far more interesting and reliable to study
this topic in 2018 rather than in 1985 with severe limitations to data. Players were
selected based on field goal attempts per game (FGA per game). The top 17 players
were chosen. A round number of twenty or fifteen players was also considered for this,
but seventeen shots per game helped get a better mix of shot variety from these players
without deflating the sample too much or increasing it to twenty with several players
having never attempted any three pointers. At 17 FGA per game or greater, most of the
top ten scorers in the league were captured along with a few other high-volume shooters.
Overall this was a better methodology than picking players that were perceived to be
“streaky” in their scoring patterns because the highest volume of shots is going to get the
standard error to be the smallest and help our chances of finding statistically significant
effects. With high volume of shot attempts also comes a larger amount of streaks that are
within the confines of a single game.
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From this selection of players, we get a whole range of variety in terms of
shooting tendencies, while still having high shots per game averages. For example,
Russell Westbrook is noted as being a very streaky jump shooter while still consistently
shooting a league leading twenty three shots per game! Anthony Davis shoots roughly at
the bottom threshold of our data, but has the second highest field goal percentage out of
the seventeen. Either way and whichever tendency, these players are the cream of the
crop and if anyone is going to produce games where the “hot” state is reached, it is these
players.
Once the players were selected, game-logs were analyzed for each and every
game played this year, gathering a mass collection of single game numbers. The players
chosen on average took around nineteen shots per game and were generally efficient with
the ball, boasting low turnover numbers and nearly fifty percent field goal percentage on
average. Each specific log of the 80+ games per player selected contains the important
order of shots taken, a description of the shot taken, and a whole mess of other
information that helped in splitting up shots types into different groups.
Before getting into which types of shots were selected as subdivisions for this
study, let’s look at the shots not included. The first large omission from the study is free
throws. This is not because they are not good for a hot hand study, but instead because of
personal preference to actual field goals being evaluated. In the public’s perception of a
player being”hot,” very rarely will we see free throws get mentioned. If anything, free
throws are only mentioned when they are not hit particularly well and are usually the first
thing an angry coach will mention in a loss if there were more misses here. Sure Dirk
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Nowitzki and James Harden have had games where they have made twenty plus free
throws in a row, but their free throw percentages are generally around ninety percent
making even this seemingly impressive feat only two shots different from their typical
outing. That being said, these shots are especially good for testing seeing that each player
is taking the same uncontested shot from the charity stripe each time with the only thing
varying is the pressure level in the game.
Specific zones for mid range jump shots were the other main omission from the
study seeing that players at this level are capable of taking “hook shots” and “floaters,”
which are very different from traditional jump shots and hard to differentiate without
greatly shrinking the sample when looking at specific streaks of these shots.
In order to test shot type specific “hot/cold hands,” the subsections were divided
into short two point field goals (0-5ft, medium two pointers(6-11ft), long two
pointers(12-23ft), three pointers (24ft+), middle three pointers (at the top of the arc), and
corner three pointers(along the 3ft between the end-lines and the flat sides of the 3 point
arc). For each section, only shot streaks corresponding to each type leading up to another
attempt in this category were used to count streak observations. For example, the result of
the fourth medium two point attempt after three consecutive makes of medium twos. If
the player attempted three pointers or dunks between these attempts, these would not be
part of the streak nor the attempt being counted in the medium two pointer section. This
allowed for a few more looks at different cross-sections within the dataset as well as
addressed the problem of shot variety affecting streaks. (See Appendix A for shot
selection diagram)
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In separating the different shots from each other, a coordinate map provided with
the data set I used from bigdataball.com was used to properly select shots to be used in
each section. The shot distance metrics were easy to separate given that shots can easily
be filtered by distance in the excel files. Location specific shots like the top of the key
and corner threes were a little bit trickier seeing that two pieces of coordinates had to be
used in filtering. Corner threes were all three pointers taken in the three foot space
between the the three point line on parallel to the sideline and up to where this line
becomes an arc fourteen feet from the baseline. These corner threes are of specific
interest to the study because of some players including Stephen Curry having these as
strategic shots that they attempt many times each game. Threes from the top of the key
were chosen in a sixteen foot square reaching from the center point of the arc at 24 feet
from the basket (eight feet on either side from the center). These also were chosen
specifically for players using this area as a strategic shot area like James Harden.
Shot distances were chosen to separate dunks from jump shots as well as regular
jump shots from longer distance attempts near the three point line. Dunks and layups are
high percentage field goal attempts that are sure to differ from typical shot attempts since
the only thing preventing a dunk and layup from going in usually is a block from a
defender. As a result, these should definitely be considered a different shot group from
the other categories.
The three pointers were divided into middle of the key and corner shots because
of obvious differences in shot distance and difficulty for some players. Also, some
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players have set spaces that they really try to be especially good shooters from like Kevin
Durant at the top of the three point arc and Steph Curry from each of the corners.
To mimic the data collected from GVT’s experiment in 1985, a shot streak was
defined as at least three makes in a row, with differences in means compared for attempts
with three plus makes versus misses. This was tested on the individual player level as
well as for the whole aggregate sample.
The second part of the study takes this classical approach to hot hands and
applies a fix to the shot selection bias that Miller and Sanjurjo have been using in their
forthcoming work. What they do is produce a randomized sample while generating a true
streak statistic to be used in the measurement of the hot hand effect. To simplify this for
the purpose of this study, the calculation for adjusting the conditional means observed to
the true number from Miller and Sanjurjo (2016) of eight percentage points will be used
to correct our initial findings under the GVT type procedure.
Below is a summary of the statistics for my dataset, as well as a frequency
distribution of makes and misses.
27699 shots were taken with a make percentage of 46.13% and shots were tallied
binarily with 1’s as makes and 0’s as misses.
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The whole basis of the Hot Hand is dependent on a change within the player on
his next attempt from his normal shot percentage, given that the past three or more shots
have been successes. What could possibly change within a player that quickly though?
Skills can take months or years to improve to the point where the impact could change
one’s shot percentage by enough to be statistically significant. Could it be an inflow of
adrenaline within the player’s system that improves his awareness and coordination? If
so, this would be extremely hard to test and can be debunked in simple experiments like
GVT’s where a few college kids are shooting one hundred shots in the gym.
A strongly educated guess would indicate that the one thing that could improve a
player’s ability to make shots in such a short amount of time would be a boost in
confidence. Yes, streakiness in the data, muscle memory, and a few other unmeasurable
other factors to be a part of the error term influencing increased make percentage, but a
perceived mind over matter factor like the hot hand definitely is likely to be heavily
weighted in something emotional like a confidence boost.
Sports psychologists have tried to pinpoint the significance of confidence in
preparing elite athletes for crucial contests and studies like Vealey’s in 1986 have even
put together instrumental frameworks for how confidence impacts performance. If
anything, the general consensus among athletes is that focus and calmness that
accompany confidence are beneficial to one’s ability to perform at a high level(Hays,
Maynard, Thomas, Bawden 2009).
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From this notion of game performance comes the impact on strategy by coaches
and general managers. If something is present that is going to help the team win, it is not
just useful to the coaching staff, but perhaps the difference between them winning a
championship or even keeping their jobs. This hot state is presented by evidence on the
court though and not from anything a player has said or done off the court to indicate
something is coming down the pipe. A way this could be investigated further on the
sports psychology side would be to look at these body language and verbal nuances
preceding potential hot streaks or cold streaks. The sports economics side of the spectrum
is more concerned with the pure mechanics that make a series of observations a hot streak
or cold streak and testing this possible effect on the player’s overall shooting percentage.
What makes a hot streak important and pertinent to sports economics though? Just
like how on base percentage was found to be an undervalued stat in major league baseball
in the 1990’s, finding players who can consistently dial in to these types of hot streaks
may lead to an increase in value in their play services the next time their contracts need to
be renewed(Hakes and Sauer 2006). This of course would be another expansion to this
literature if a study were to come out showing players who consistently get into these
streaks and their efficiency numbers versus other similar players in the league.
Confidence leading to hot streaks and hot streaks leading to team wins in an
extremely competitive league of play even in small doses is enough to be a matter worth
being looked into. The average margin of victory for winning teams in the NBA in the
2016-2017 season was a mere three points, meaning that in an 82 game season even as
slight of an effect as Arkes’s 1.9 percentage point hot hand in a player could cause a

16

several game swing minimum in a team schedule of contests decided by two or three
points. Such a swing could mean the difference between the playoffs and another long
offseason from the outside looking in, not to mention millions of dollars in playoff ticket
revenue missed for a franchise.
Is every shot going to make or cost a team millions of dollars and a chance to win
the game? No way! What the hot hand does though is give players a better chance than
usual in circumstances where a shot could be worth that or more in some cases, and
therefore has been a valuable effect, if true, worth studying.
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IV. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this study, it is important to note that this sample of roughly 28,000 shots is
bound to have specific tendencies and trends, which is why this next section shows us a
brief dissection of the data in the subsections that will later be used to compare
conditional means.
To start off the methods used in analyzing the sample, we begin with a simple
snapshot of how common certain streak lengths are up to four plus makes or misses in a
row. This shows us that past three makes/misses, the number chosen as the main streak
length used in the next section, the data shrinks down to the point where only ten percent
of the sample remains.
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Frequency Data
(Misses)
All Shots

short 2s(05ft)

medium 2s (611ft)

long 2s(1223ft)

3s(24ft+)

Observations

27699

8375

2753

9159

7955

Streak of 2+

7935

1338

969

3577

3190

Streak of 3+

4186

540

577

2221

1996

Streak of 4+

2228

217

355

1404

1254

% of total shots
taken 2+

28.65%

15.98%

35.20%

39.05%

40.10%

% of total shots
taken 3+

15.11%

6.45%

20.96%

24.25%

25.09%

% of total shots
taken 4+

8.04%

2.59%

12.90%

15.33%

15.76%

(Table 1)
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Frequency Data
(Makes)
All Shots

short 2s(05ft)

medium 2s (611ft)

long 2s(1223ft)

3s(24ft+)

Observations

27699

8375

2753

9159

7955

Streak of 2+

5789

3069

511

1328

1078

Streak of 3+

2615

1883

225

510

391

Streak of 4+

1167

1171

101

204

136

% of total shots
taken 2+

20.90%

36.64%

18.56%

14.50%

13.55%

% of total shots
taken 3+

9.44%

22.48%

8.17%

5.57%

4.92%

% of total shots
taken 4+

4.21%

13.98%

3.67%

2.23%

1.71%

(Table 2)
In no way is this an evaluation of the hot or cold states in players, but an
interesting prelude to the conditional mean comparisons to come. To summarize, short 2s
had more long shot streaks than all other categories and everything else had more long
magnitude miss streaks, which increased with distance from the rim.
What was found is that, as expected, frequency of shot make streaks decreased
with distance away from the rim and miss streaks increased with distance. If anything,
numbers were lower than expected in make streaks beyond three with only around five
percent of observations fitting this criteria across the board. This surprisingly low amount
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of streaks is most likely due to the sheer difficulty for players in this league to make or
miss more than four shots in a row seeing that the game situation is constantly changing.
For example, Russell Westbrook could in the same game make three open dunks in a row
with three missed three pointers in between and this swathe of data would count it as
three 1 shot makes/misses instead of two one three shot streaks. In order to combat this,
we broke the data down further and switched up the types of shots observed.
To further simplify what counts as a streak, it is a shot where the result of the
attempted shot N+1 is different from shot N. In a sequence of fifteen shots looking like
Hit, Hit, Hit, Miss, Hit, Hit, Miss, Hit, Miss, Miss, Hit, Hit, Hit, Hit, Hit, the results of
what would be counted as streaks are described in the table below.
(Frequency Distribution of Streak Length in a 15 Shot Sequence)
Length

1

2

3

4

5+

Hits

1

1

1

0

1

Misses

2

1

0

0

0

(Table 3)
The short two pointers had the strongest and only case for something resembling
good conditions for a hot hand within the data because of longer streak numbers of four
plus being four times more frequent than the average for all shots. Of course shot miss
streaks were very uncommon here being “easy” buckets, but these were decreasing at a
similar rate to the make streak’s increasing. Here we see the number of players hitting
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four plus shots in a row skyrocket compared to the other subsections, but just because
these shots are closer does not necessarily mean these are “gimme” buckets. Defense
around the rim is very tight. (Just watch any bit of Lebron James’ or Anthony Davis’
defensive highlights) These shots can and do get blocked frequently and sometimes even
the pros miss dunks. Of course, it makes sense that if hot hands were present in this data
set it would be here at least because of the difficulty of being “cold” from five feet out!
Also, no shots where players were fouled were included in this part.
Although these players’ averages do not really show it, many of these shots
longer 2s and 3s are probably fifty percent more difficult than closer in attempts, making
it much easier to get a miss streak going than closer inside. The players in the data set are
also superstar caliber meaning that their consistency is by definition better than average,
otherwise they would be the average NBA player. With this in mind, players of this skill
level are able to recognize their cold states and refrain from shooting after two or three
misses. So although we do have stronger evidence of cold streaks here in terms of
available observations, these streaks are mitigated by player skills and awareness to their
temporarily ineffective shooting.
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V. RESULTS
To get into the process behind our GVT inspired two sample hypothesis testing of
the means, first samples of shots attempted after specific numbers of makes and misses
had to be evaluated. The intuition here is that make percentage after a make or miss
streak should be the same as the regular overall make percentage, which was GVT’s null
hypothesis. If a difference is statistically significant between these means, the null is
rejected and a hot state may exist. Through a use of dummy/categorical variables, shots
were classified in the whole sample along with each smaller spot based pool of shots.
From here, differences between attempts conditional on each streak magnitude were
calculated and tested for statistical significance by player and as a whole.

(Table 4)
As expected, filtering the data into shot categories and even further into three plus
makes/misses shrinks the sample dramatically. With a sample of this size though, a
reasonable amount of shots are still left to analyze even with some groups only having
under 1% of the total data population. Only a few selected shot types yield anything close
to a statistically significant hot hand effect with right corner three pointers having a
massive seventeen percentage point difference in conditional means and medium length
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two pointers having a six percentage point difference. The rest of the other shot types
were either not statistically significant or had magnitudes in the negative direction
meaning that shot accuracy was seeming to increase after a miss streak and decrease after
a make streak.
Short twos are especially hard to get a statistically significant difference because
of the high make percentage relative to other shots. Making three layups in a row is
obviously a different feat than three three pointers and thus a true hot streak of short ange
attempts is bound to be higher and thus many non hot streaks are captured by using only
three straight makes. Increasing the number of shot successes on these shots though
increases the chances of stretching beyond the confines of a single game as well as
borders on banking on a player having an especially high number of attempts in a row,
when the data shows that there are very limited instances of make streaks over four shots.

(Table 5)
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For the shot streaks divided up by players, results were even more disappointing
with nobody having a statistically significant increase in make percentage after three plus
makes and four players having decreases in make percentage by double digits at the 5 or
10% significance level.
At first glance, this looks dismal for the existence of the hot hand as it did in
GVT’s study in 1985(table 1 with 76ers numbers in their work) with only Daryl Dawkins
having statistically significant differences in shot percentage, but in the wrong direction.
Most people after reading these results immediately go to the intuition that in the NBA
once a player makes three shots in a row defenses tighten to stop him and of course after
three misses the defenses are more likely to let him shoot. What really is going on here is
a selection bias in the data from looking only at shot streaks of either makes or misses.
Intuitively, we could say that the logic behind comparing the pure conditional means
between the two types of streaks is sound, but it is when we pick something “randomly”
from this finite sample of “assigned” attempts to represent the whole population that the
difference of means runs into some flaws(Miller and Sanjurjo 2015).
Although a coin has the 50/50 chance of being heads or tails, the arithmetic
mean of the combinations is only 5/12 since instances where a certain number of heads
are flipped in a row with more recorded observations are weighted the same as flips with
more tails. For example, a streak of three straight flips resulting in heads is weighted the
same as two straight or a single flip. In order to get this fair coin’s arithmetic mean up to
the correct 50/50 proportion, numbers of streaks were divided by streak opportunities
instead of just the raw flip numbers. This way the problem of having all numbers
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represented as equally informative when streak values in reality are more informative by
nature is corrected and the predicted probability is returned to its actual value.

Miller and Sanjurjo’s forthcoming work that attempts to revive the existence of
the hot hand not only accounts for this selection bias, but shows us that there is indeed a
statistical explanation for the lack of significant coefficients as well as a few being
significant in the wrong direction. It is because the actual mean of the next shot attempt
after a miss is between eight and twelve percentage points on average below the raw
average of makes from the whole population. With this in mind, a player in a hot state
only needs to match his season average in the streaks for it to really be a statistically
significant difference from the true expected value.

The size of the bias is at its greatest streak length of five successes or failures in
Miller and Sanjurjo’s study(See their size of the bias graph in figure 1 in their 2016
paper). At the streak length of three used for this study using the same rough expected
shot value as GVT of .5, we see a bias size of around four to six percentage points. To
find the exact size of the bias for each expected make percentage value, we would use the
formula and equations that are also from Miller and Sanjurjo’s forthcoming work.

After using this equation with the streak info of three shots equaling K in another
study where Miller and Sanjurjo compiled twenty eight years of NBA shot data, they
found roughly an 8 percentage point difference in the true conditional mean versus the
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initial calculations from the GVT methodology. Thinking back to the fair coin having a
true arithmetic mean of .405, these shot attempts have similar numbers once adjusted
using this 8 percentage point cushion. I use this amount to adjust for the bias in my study
because if twenty eight years worth of data being used as their sample to calculate for this
bias in NBA players is still yielding an eight percent difference, then this is a
conservative estimation to be used for a smaller study with players of similar caliber.
The other main reason that eight percentage points is used is because nba three
point shootout performers are all All Stars just like the seventeen players selected for this
study. A an average shooting percentage of the top ten three point shooters in the league
that get invited to the contest have around a .40-.46 three point field goal percentage,
which is fairly similar to the shooting numbers of my sample’s averages. Of course these
numbers will not be perfect, but this number should get us close to the true biased
adjusted effect of the hot hand. To further lowball the effect in estimation, I have also
included a three percentage point correction to represent the bottom threshold that Miller
and Sanjurjo make note of in their work. The results here are almost as impressive as they
were in Miller and Sanjurjo’s working paper.

(Table 6)
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(Table 7)
Starting with the group data, now all but two shot types are statistically significant
and are positive in magnitude. Right three pointers is still the clear leader having a 25
percentage point increase in make percentage in the hot state. In the by player group
below, we find similar results, with only Kawhi Leonard and Steph Curry having shot
percentage decreases after three makes. The rest are generally around six percentage
points better in make percentage after three makes and statistically significant. Dramatic
results all around are to be expected when a bias this large is adjusted for and keep in
mind that these are some of the lower level bias adjustments compared to the .10 used on
GVT’s work by Miller and Sanjurjo.

(Table 8)
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(Table 9)
In terms of the cold state, the calculations would just flip between P/3makeP/3miss to P/3miss-P/make, yielding parallel flipped results. This makes sense because
the best control of a shooting performance state is its counterpart because if a state truly
exists, the difference would be greatest between these two scenarios leading into each
attempt. A regular average here may be biased in either direction seeing that it could be at
the beginning of a hot or cold state, and thus making the difference between conditional
means artificially smaller just like how the coin flip numbers are artificially lowered by
the .5 probability of an outcome being used instead of the arithmetic mean. As for the
players with opposite signs on their hot versus cold data, a few factors may lead to a valid
explanation of this occurrence. One is that the cold state may be more potent.
Between these two different states we tested, a few explanations can be made for
why a cold state is in fact more potent than the hot state. First, is that it could be more
psychologically draining for each miss accumulated on a cold streak than makes are
empowering in a hot streak. This is consistent with psychological research that shows
that negative emotions are more potent than neutral or positive ones (Negativity Bias). A
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large amount of misses in a row has the consequences of missed opportunity and creates
a chance for the other team to pull ahead or drift away in the game. For example, let’s say
James Harden has missed four field goals in a row and the opposing team has now
opened up a six point lead. That next shot he takes may have a little bit of a rattle of the
the last few misses in it in terms of pressure of not letting the game slip beyond reach.
For a hot streak, that fourth shot may be more of a check to see if the magic is in
fact there, like a Stephen Curry near half-court shot once a six point lead has been opened
up thanks to his streak.
The second point is that it is overall much easier to play sloppy than it is to be at
an above average level of play. With that being said, it is also harder to be absolutely
perfect from the field than it is to be zero for fifteen. Of course there are diminishing
returns to effort in either direction, but these players are the best in the business and are
more than capable of making someone else look foolish on a bad day than anyone else on
the planet.
Also, what is this decrease in shot percentage after make streaks and increase in
shot percentage in miss streaks for a few players even after the fix has been made? A
negative correlation here is not a “cold state, but a correction to what has transpired over
the past few attempts. On make streaks it may be the defense tightening up on that player
and on miss streaks it could be a player being extra careful before his next attempt to
make sure that the miss streak ends.
Basketball in itself is a game with strategy and of course within the context of
this, it is expected that tendencies and patterns are corrected for and adjusted by players
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and coaches to improve the chances of winning. Another large part of GVT’s error in
their original study was not controlling for this type of in game self correcting. Just
because one looks at the result following a shot streak does not mean that the effect tested
for is going to pop out when many other factors such as strategy may be cancelling it out.
Dixit and Nalebuff mention this piece of game theory briefly in the first chapter of their
1991 book Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge In Business, Politics, And
Everyday Life.

“While the statistical evidence denies the presence of streak shooting, it does not refute
the possibility that a “hot” player might warm up the game in some other way. The
difference between streak shooting and a hot hand arises because of the interaction
between the offensive and the defensive strategies. Suppose [a player] does have a truly
hot hand. Surely the other side would start to crowd him. This could easily lower his
shooting percentage.”
(Dixit and Nalebuff 1991)
Of course, this adjustment in strategy would almost never come into play with
free throws, making Arkes’ 1.9 percent still a solid estimation and the Celtic free throw
part of GVT’s study unaffected. The only time strategy could come into play on free
throws is if a player needs a strategic miss to run out the clock at the end of a game that
could break a shot streak continued otherwise. These scenarios are decently rare in close
games given the exact timing this situation would play out.
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To wrap up this defining part of the study, both effects are large enough to impact
these star players, who are the picture of consistency given that scoring over twenty
points per game in the most competitive basketball league out there is incredibly difficult
to accomplish. If the effects are this large with the best of the best in the NBA right now,
imagine the effects on regular starters, benchwarmers, or even you or me. Here we tested
a realm in which the hot or cold state would be best showcased, but on the other hand
hardest to attain. A truly amazing performance in pickup games, high school, and even
college pale in comparison to one on this stage because of the competition, the viewing
pressure, and money earning stakes are as large as they could ever be. Players and
coaches’ careers are determined by performance and victories. Inefficient strategies may
shift the structure of a multi-billion dollar industry.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, we took the popular urban myth/ playing phenomenon of the “hot
hand” in basketball and put it to the test at the highest level of competition in the NBA.
What we found is that in a star player’s games, hot and cold streaks are a statistically
different scenario from any other selection of shots. From here, the hot and cold state can
be dissected further into two parts. The small version or microscale is a brief stint in
which a player out shoots or undershoots his average by a substantial amount with k
number of makes or misses in a row, but it is not a large enough set of shots to draw a
statistical inference from on its own.
For example, the aforementioned perfect triple double by Russell Westbrook
where he was six for six from the field can be considered a micro hot state because for
those six shots he was almost sixty percent better from the field than his season average.
However, so few shots were taken that it cannot be used for a statistical comparison
unless of course he had several streaks within the same game. The Macroscale is what we
tested which is a game to game measure of make percentage after a certain number of
shots have been made or missed in a row. These games may include multiple instances of
both states, but for it to be considered a true macro hot state, the hot effect has to
dominate any coldness by enough to make it statistically different from the recent
shooting averages on the positive end. Basically a hot state cannot just have three makes
in a row and a regular amount of makes on the fourth attempt, but instead have enough
fourth shot makes to make it statistically different from shots after a miss streak.
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With Miller and Sanjurjo’s correction on the means of hot and cold streak data,
we then get a fair estimate of means for comparison. What was found is indeed an
average statistical difference of roughly four percentage points in make percentage
between hot states and cold states in player by player numbers and roughly a ten
percentage point difference for players by shot specific groupings. Both are much larger
than the 1.9 percentage point difference found in Arkes’ 2010 study and certainly more
than the 1.2 percentage point difference in Andrew Bocskocsky, John Ezekowitz, and
Carolyn Stein’s 2014 study. If anything, what is amazing is that these players are so
consistent that most games in general fall within five percentage points of each player’s
average or less than half of a standard deviation, which makes either side of this a drastic
change from the norm.
In conclusion, the best players in the world have good days and bad days like
anybody. However, on a few days, a hot or cold state may make them a statistically
different player on the next shot. Coaches and players should adjust their strategies
accordingly to the in-game performance of players. Relying on season averages fails to
maximize efficiency when considering the variability of player performances in a “hot”
or “cold” state. Perhaps the final shot should be taken by the game’s best player not the
season’s best player. The next time you see the star of your favorite NBA team rip up a
defense for forty points and shoot fifteen for twenty two from the field, know that it is not
magic, but a hot hand.
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APPENDIX A
Shot Selection Diagram
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